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                          ARTICLE     
  Socioeconomic rights in constitutional 
law: Explaining America away   
        Frank I.         Michelman      *                           
  The apparent absence of a commitment to socioeconomic rights in United States 
constitutional law gives rise to continuing debate. It is unclear that this omission has 
any bearing on the actual performance of American governments in the social welfare 
ﬁ  eld. Might there be other reasons for treating the omission as problematic? If so, 
might the omission nevertheless be explained in terms consistent with the belief that 
some kind of socioeconomic commitment ideally does belong in the constitutional law 
of a country like the U.S.? After brieﬂ  y reviewing the uneasy instrumental case for a 
constitutionalized socioeconomic commitment, this article suggests why inclusion 
could be demanded, nonetheless, as a matter of political-moral principle. It then 
canvasses possible responses to the American case. These include both a possible denial 
that socioeconomic guarantees are, in fact, lacking from U.S. constitutional law and a 
possible claim that omitting them is the correct choice for the U.S. as a matter of 
nonideal  political  morality.     
  Is the United States of America a welfare state? Does United States constitu-
tional law contain any socioeconomic guarantees? Whichever way your snap 
answers go  — maybe   “ no ”   and   “ no ”   for most readers  —  you can get an argu-
ment in response. It is clear why people care about the ﬁ  rst question, less clear 
why anyone cares about the second, and, again, clear that many do care about 
the second. Cass Sunstein sees a need to explain why the American Constitution 
lacks what it lacks.  1  The  “ social rights ”  question begets books and more books, 
devoted not just to programmatic issues but, in at least equal measure, to ques-
tions of the prescriptive content of constitutional law that can make no differ-
ence for anyone’s life without concrete implementation from lawmakers and 
    *     Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard Law School. Email:   fmichel@law.harvard.edu     
  1      See  Cass R. Sunstein,  Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees ?, 56 
 S YR. L. REV.   1 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein,   American Constitution ].   See also   Cass R. Sunstein,   Why 
Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees? ,   in    A MERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS   90 (Michael Ignatieff ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2005).   
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bureaucrats.  2   I have nagged at the constitutional law question over a span of 
forty years.  3   Why? 
  Below, I consider what reasons Americans today might have for favoring 
inclusion of socioeconomic guarantees in their constitutional law. I then turn 
to a consideration of how they might nevertheless conclude in favor of leaving 
the law in its current state, however exceptional in the world that state might 
prove to be.  4  
      1.       Terms and distinctions 
      1.1.       Constitutive commitments 
 Here is the country’s president, proclaiming a new chapter in its constitutional 
law: 
  …   We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which 
a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all  …   . I ask 
the Congress to explore the means for implementing this economic bill of 
rights  —  for it is deﬁ  nitely the responsibility of the Congress to do so  …   . 5    
  Franklin D. Roosevelt listed guarantees respecting jobs, food and clothing, 
homes, medical care and health, education, and social security.  6   Seeing to these 
would be   “  the responsibility of the Congress,  ”   pursuant to   “  a Second Bill of 
Rights.  ”   That language evokes the Constitution and constitutional law, most 
certainly not by accident. We know the dénouement: in the years since FDR’s 
declaration, the idea that U.S. constitutional law might harbor any sort of 
welfare-state mandate has been burnished by pundits,  7   put to the test, and 
  2       See ,   e.g. ,   EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE   (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. 
Gross eds., Hart 2007).   Compare   Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1 (  “ Political  actors, 
even those interested in helping poor people, have been skeptical about the likely effectiveness of 
constitutional provisions that might be ignored in practice  ” ).  
  3      See ,  e.g. , Frank I. Michelman,  Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment , 
83   HARV. L. REV  . 7 (1969) [hereinafter Michelman,   Foreword  ]; Frank I. Michelman,   The Constitu-
tion, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justiﬁ  cation  , in   EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS ,   supra   note 2, at 21.   
  4       See   Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 3  –  4 (suggesting that this is, indeed, an in-
stance of American exceptionalism).   
  5         Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13   THE 
PUBLIC P APERS  AND A DDRESSES  OF F RANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT   40  –  42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., Random 
House 1950).   
  6       See id.   
  7       See ,   e.g,,   Michelman,   Foreword ,   supra   note 3; Frank I. Michelman,   Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy  , 1979   WASH  . U.L.Q. 659 [hereinafter Michelman,   Welfare Rights  ]. The academic 
interest continues.   See ,   e.g.  , Goodwin Liu,   Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights ,   STAN. L. REV.  
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decisively rejected.  8   Or so most well-informed lawyers would certainly report. 
Was FDR, then, a false prophet? 
 If he was, it is not because he envisioned developments in our constitutional 
law that have not, in fact, taken hold. Cass Sunstein surmises that only for 
want of a nail did a post – New Deal constitutionalization of the welfare state fail 
of consummation in this country.   “  Social and economic rights, American-
style,  ”   Sunstein speculates, could very possibly have become   “  a part of 
American constitutional understandings  ”   if Hubert Humphrey had been 
elected President in 1968.  9  A series of decisions issuing from the Warren Court 
had seemed headed toward recognition of some sort of socioeconomic guaran-
tee in our constitutional law,  10  and happenstance — Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam 
quagmire leading to the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency, and then 
the occurrence of four Supreme Court vacancies on Nixon’s watch  11  — may  be 
all that cut the development short.On that view of events, American constitu-
tional socioeconomic rights may perhaps be deemed an accidental  “ casualty of 
an election that was fought out on other grounds.  ”  12  
  None of that is what I mean by acquitting FDR of mistaking our constitu-
tional law’s trajectory. I mean, rather, that constitutional law  —  or, at least, 
what we usually mean by constitutional law  —  never was FDR’s intended or 
predicted medium for the second bill. FDR’s guarded claim was that Americans 
had   “  accepted, so to speak,  ”   an economic bill of rights. To put the matter that 
way seems more to point away from constitutional law than toward it, as the 
medium of acceptance.  13  
  Toward what, then, did FDR point, if not toward constitutional law? 
Sunstein has the answer, in the form of what he has neatly dubbed the   “ con-
stitutive commitments  ”   of American society.  14   On Sunstein’s account, these 
are top-priority, popular canonical expectations for the conduct of American 
  8       See   DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S . 464 (1972); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).   
  9       See   Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 22.   
  10         Sunstein here cites Michelman,   Foreword, supra   note 3.   
  11       See   Sunstein,   American Constitution  ,   supra   note 1, at 20  –  23.   
  12       Id.   at 23.   
  13     Might Bruce Ackerman be tempted to claim that Roosevelt’s  “ so to speak ”  was a harbinger of the 
theory of nonformal amendment and   “ constitutional  moments ”   (s ee ,   e.g. ,   BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS   266  –  267 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991))? I do not think so. As Sunstein points 
out, New Dealers, fresh from frustration at the hands of the Nine Old Men, were anything but keen 
to   “  increase the authority of judges  ”   by putting the welfare state into constitutional law.   See  
Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 12, 14.   
  14       C ASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT 
MORE THAN EVER   62 (Basic Books 2004).   4 I•CON   
government. They are the stuff of public political sensibilities and debates, not 
of lawyers  ’   constitutional law. Sunstein gives as examples the claims, in the 
United States today, to be free to join a union without risking your job, to be 
secure against racial discrimination by private employers, and to social secu-
rity.  15   The public’s expectations of government’s recognition of these claims 
could have arisen, and could subside, without amendment of the Constitution; 
they exist, in Sunstein’s account, alongside constitutional law, not inside it. By 
shortchanging these claims or by reneging on the commitment to fashion laws 
and policies with a view to honoring them, Congress would not violate any 
law. Yet such conduct would, Sunstein maintains, be widely received as a 
comparably grave violation of the public trust, unless and until there had 
taken place in our country a mutation in   “ public  judgments ”   on a scale for 
which a constitutional amendment would be a suitable form of expression.  16  
 If Sunstein is right about the current content of American constitutive com-
mitments, then perhaps FDR may be said to have prophesied truly our accept-
ance,   “  so to speak,  ”   of a second bill of rights. If Sunstein is wrong about that, 
FDR was correspondingly wrong about the impending course of American pol-
itics. Regarding the course of American constitutional law, however, I believe 
the president placed no bets. Whether Sunstein is right or wrong about 
welfare-state policies having made it onto the ledger of American constitutive 
commitments, it is fairly plain that they have not made it onto the ledger of 
American constitutional-legal guarantees. Let us, for now, take it as estab-
lished that they have not. My ﬁ  rst question about that is: Why should anyone 
care, any more than FDR probably did?   
      1.2.       In constitutional law 
  Before proceeding, we should make sure we know what we are talking about, 
when we speak of getting socioeconomic rights into constitutional law. 
Questions can come up at any time about whether this or that scheme of state 
provision for people’s material wants (Social Security, say, or food stamps) 
ought to be set in place, removed, or revised. Resolving such questions is not 
what we mean when we talk about getting socioeconomic rights into constitu-
tional law. But what, then, do we mean, exactly? What sorts of question  —
  beyond or distinct from those posed to policy makers by programmatic issues 
when they show up on parliamentary and bureaucratic agendas  —  do we take 
to be raised by talk of putting socioeconomic   “ rights ”   into   “ law ”   that  is 
  “ constitutional ” ? 
  Undoubtedly, the term   “ socioeconomic  rights ”   names a certain class of 
norms, meaning, by  “ norm, ”  simply a guide to conduct that somehow, in some 
way, transcends the purely optional. Our question, for the moment, is what it 
  15       See id.   
  16       Id.   Michelman  |  Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law   5
means for a norm to exist in (or as) constitutional law, and we may as well start 
with   “ law. ”   What does it mean for a norm to exist   “ in  law ”  —  as distinct, say, 
from   “ in  morals ”   or   “  in social practice  ”  ? For purposes of the current inquiry, it 
seems we can best use an answer that holds open the vexed question of whether 
a norm can be said to exist in law regardless of expected judicial responses to 
ostensible deviations. Therefore, for now, I shall say, simply, that a norm exists 
in law  —  has been gotten into law  —  when a legal inquiry will identify it as one 
of those norms to which anyone who aims to be law-abiding should, for that 
very reason, normally feel a substantial if not decisive pressure to adhere. To 
get a norm into law is to produce a state of public affairs in which that sort of 
pressure can be expected to impinge on whoever is supposed to bear obliga-
tions attendant upon the norm. Conceiving of positive legality in such vague, 
watery, even circular, terms is, of course, jurisprudentially tendentious and 
maybe fatuous  —  a far cry from   “  [t] he prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact and nothing more pretentious is what I mean by law.  ”  17   But please bear 
with me: there is a method in this madness. 
  Now, what about   “ constitutional ”   law? In my scheme of deﬁ  nitions, consti-
tutional law is normative stuff that exerts the pressure of law on a country’s 
ordinary lawmakers — meaning by  “ ordinary lawmakers ”  whoever is in a posi-
tion to decide the content of any and all of the country’s law that is not consti-
tutional law.  18   Thus, to get a norm into constitutional law means to produce a 
condition in which the country’s ordinary lawmakers are brought under the 
sort of pressure for compliance that legal norms, in general, are expected to 
exert. Getting  “ socioeconomic rights ”  into constitutional law means garnering 
that sort of effect for the class of norms to which we give that name.   
      1.3.       Socioeconomic rights 
  And what, then, would be this class? As a class, the norms called   “ socioeco-
nomic rights  ”   envision a desired set of social outcomes  —  roughly, that the 
rights holders at no time should lack access to levels deemed adequate of sub-
sistence, housing, health care, education, and safety or to the means of obtain-
ing the same (say, through available, remunerated work) for themselves and 
their dependents. Now, we speak here of  “ rights ”  and that term usually denotes 
a class of warranted demands, where the warrant may be legal, moral, or 
  “ social, ”   as the case may be. Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law thus 
would appear to be legally warranted claims to some line of conduct by the 
state and its functionaries  —  including, not least, ordinary lawmakers  — by 
which the desired result will, in fact, be produced. Again, however, my aims 
are best served by a somewhat weaker conception. Let us speak, then, of legal 
  17         O. W. Holmes, Jr.,   The Path of the Law  , 10   HARV. L. REV.   457, 461 (1897).   
  18         Of course, that is not the only way to understand the idea of constitutional law  —  jurists in the 
United Kingdom have historically understood it quite differently — but it is the way that is germane 
to the aims of this paper.   6 I•CON   
obligations on lawmakers to make their best effort to devise, adopt, and execute 
policies and measures that will result in the desired social-outcome targets. 
Presumably,   “ best ”   efforts will be ones that take due account of certain other, 
perhaps circumstantially competing, principles (liberty, dignity, independence, 
self-respect, self-sufﬁ  ciency, the rule of formally realizable law, general eco-
nomic prosperity) that may appear in the same constitution’s order of values. 
  Such a best-efforts obligation  —  what I shall sometimes call a   “ socioeco-
nomic commitment ”  — appears to be the sort of norm usually envisaged by talk 
of socioeconomic rights in constitutional law.  19   Interlocutors typically seem to 
have in mind something like the South African model: a declaration of every-
one’s rights of access to adequate housing, food, water, health care services, 
and social security, coupled with a mandate to the state to take   “ reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within available resources, to achieve the pro-
gressive realization  ”   of these rights.  20   Indeed, there is a plain reason why con-
stitutionalized socioeconomic commitments are likely to assume such an 
open-ended form. How would you make them any more programmatically 
explicit, if you could, and hope to have them constitutionalized  — entrenched 
in the country’s highest-ranking law  —  by any process possessed of a modicum 
of sincerity and prudence?  21    
      2.       Why care? 
      2.1.       Instrumental reasons 
  Back, now, to our question. If, owing to failures on the part of American gov-
ernments and legislatures, the   “ rights ”   in FDR’s proposed second bill go unful-
ﬁ  lled, then those failures are obviously something for latter-day New Dealers to 
deplore and seek to rectify. But is there any reason why our constitutional 
law’s indifference to such questions (if indifference it be) ought to trouble any 
American’s mind or conscience? New Dealers want American governments 
and legislatures to pursue devotedly the Rooseveltian vision, but why should 
  19       See ,   e.g. ,   SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE  AND  THE C ONSTITUTION   42 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) 
(observing that   “  the logic of positive constitutionalism  …  promises no more than or less than a 
good effort  ” ).  
  20       S .   A FR. CONST. 1996,   §§ 26, 27.   
  21         A commentator on a prior version of this paper charged me with changing the subject from 
  “ socioeconomic rights ”  to mere  “ commitments ”  that are not true rights. I hope my exposition to this 
point makes sufﬁ  ciently clear that there is no incontrovertible, conceptual barrier to positing a best-
efforts commitment as the obligation correlative to a constitutional-legal, socioeconomic right. It is 
worth noting that the exposition, up to this point, circumvents debate about whether the political 
theory implicitly undergirding any socioeconomic rights, which might appear in one or another 
country’s constitutional law, is a   “ right-based, ”    “ duty-based, ”   or   “ goal-based ”   theory, in the classi-
ﬁ  cation proposed by  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY  171 – 173 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977). 
A right is still a right, regardless of which sort of background theory prompts its recognition.   Michelman  |  Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law   7
they care what constitutional law has to say about it? In what way, if any, may 
U.S. constitutional law be thought the poorer or the worse for its failure to 
speak to the question of socioeconomic guarantees? 
  The most immediately inviting line of response to these questions is instru-
mental, in either a judge-centered or a popular-constitutionalist version. Either 
version (or any combination of the two) must respond to an obvious worry: 
Courts of law are widely viewed as ill-equipped to appraise state performance of 
a South Africa-style, best-efforts commitment  —  which, we have said, seems to 
be the only sort of socioeconomic commitment that prudence will allow into 
constitutional law. Performance in this ﬁ  eld involves complexly designed and 
coordinated government action in the forms of taxes, transfers, subsidies, and 
policy instruments affecting markets, industries, families, education, health, 
internal and external trade, and the monetary system. The choices needing to 
be made are subtle, technical, interactive, uncertain, subject-to-experience, 
and endlessly debatable. It is far from clear how courts of law can inject them-
selves into such matters with much credibility or authority. 
  So what? Never mind these courts, you might say, under populist persua-
sion; the point of giving constitutional-legal form and expression to moral intu-
itions of socioeconomic   “ rights ”   is to generate political churn. It is to provide a 
goad, a platform, and a focus for a continuing political mobilization to press the 
Rooseveltian vision by popular means, including the vote;  22   and perhaps it is 
also to make that vision an explicit part of the conscientious legislator’s stand-
ard guide to good conduct in ofﬁ  ce.  23   But, then, are you confusing constitu-
tional law with Sunsteinian constitutive commitment? Without a boost from a 
political-cultural condition of constitutive commitment, how can you hope to 
achieve the reform of constitutional law you say you seek? Once you have the 
constitutive commitment in hand, what further support for continuing politi-
cal mobilization can you want? 
  How, after all, do you inject welfare-state norms into constitutional law 
when they are not already there? One way is the   “ juristocratic ”   way: judges 
reading the norms into a doctrinal corpus that does not self-evidently contain 
them.  24  That can happen, although not, perhaps, exactly according to the taste 
  22       See    L ARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW   (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2004).   
  23      See  Paul Brest,  The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation , 27  STAN. L. REV.  
585 (1975).   
  24       “ Juristocracy ”   appears to be coinage of Ran Hirschl.   See    R AN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE 
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM   (Harvard Univ. Press 2004). On the point of 
non-self-evidence in the U.S. case, the most telling testimony comes from two egalitarian liberals: 
Cass Sunstein, who pleads constitutive commitment in lieu of constitutional law, and Ronald 
Dworkin, who denies that even Judge Hercules can ﬁ  nd socioeconomic guarantees in American 
constitutional law, while   “ wishing ”   for moral reasons that the case were otherwise.   See    R ONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW   36 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).   8 I•CON   
of popular constitutionalists and not, perhaps, without the kind and degree of 
support and prodding from society that the notion of constitutive commitment 
encapsulates.  25   The other way is through express constitutional amendment. 
Again, however, Americans cannot hope to pass a welfare-state amendment 
without ﬁ  rst accomplishing the political work required to bring national public 
opinion to the point of a constitutive commitment. In fact, they will have to 
bring it beyond that point, because, in the United States, constitutional amend-
ment meets with resistance from sources beyond substantive disagreements of 
ideology and policy. Such sources include both doctrinaire anti-juristocracy 
(inasmuch as every additional bill-of-rights norm threatens to widen the 
authority of judges) and doctrinaire   “ anti-amendmentitis. ”  26   Converting a 
New Dealish constitutive commitment into constitutional law thus requires a 
major additional push. Speaking strictly from the standpoint of popular consti-
tutionalism, that extra expenditure of effort will be wasted if it succeeds. The 
new constitutional law, if it could be obtained, would do no more in support of 
popular mobilization than the constitutive commitment already in hand. 
  Ah, well, you say, but maybe constitutional law is the will-o  ’ -the-wisp,  the 
pot at the end of the rainbow. Maybe drumming up a sustained campaign for 
constitutional-legal reform, whether by means of amendment or interpreta-
tion, is the best way to build and ignite the constitutive commitment  — or  the 
popular, intersubjective awareness of it  —  that is, after all, the ultimate aim of 
populist constitutional law.  27   I am happy to grant the point.  28   It offers no 
answer to my question about why or how, if at all, U.S. constitutional law 
should be thought the poorer or the worse for its failure to contain a welfare-
state amendment or to speak to the question of welfare-state guarantees. 
  Enter your more judge-centered, instrumental theory. By writing (or read-
ing) welfare-state guarantees into constitutional law, you would engage an 
inﬂ  uential national institution  —  the national judiciary  —  in adjudicative over-
sight of the adequacy of governmental performance regarding them. Granting 
that courts are ill-equipped for ﬁ  ne-tuned appraisals of governmental efforts in 
  25       See   Robert Post,   Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law  , 117   HARV. 
L. REV.  4, 8, 9 (2003) (positing and describing  “ a continuous exchange between constitutional law 
and constitutional culture  ” ).  
  26       See   Kathleen M. Sullivan,   “  Constitutional Amendmentitis , ”    T HE A MERICAN P ROSPECT  , Nov. 30, 
2002.  
  27       See   Elizabeth M. Schneider,   The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women’s 
Movement  , 61   N.Y.U. L. REV  . 598 (1986).   
  28         For historical documentation, see, for example, Reva Siegel,   Constitutional Culture, Social Move-
ment Conﬂ  ict and Constitutional Change: the Case of the De Facto ERA ,  94   CAL. L. REV.   1323  (2006). 
In the case that Siegel recounts, the process of struggle for explicit amendment wound up producing 
a   “ de  facto ”   equivalent, made up of a combination of civil rights legislation and judicialized consti-
tutional interpretation. The question, though, is how much the constitutional-interpretation part 
adds to the total effect.    Michelman  |  Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law   9
this ﬁ  eld, does that totally disqualify them from a potentially helpful role? 
Allowing for the obvious — that  “ no court can ensure ”  fulﬁ  llment of a socioeco-
nomic commitment  —  you might still ﬁ  nd that worldwide experience suggests 
that inclusion of socioeconomic commitments in a country’s constitutional 
law courts may enable courts to   “  take steps to ensure that basic needs receive 
a degree of priority, and to correct conspicuous neglect.  ”  29   Not everyone 
regards that as a good bet, however. Uncertainty remains high about whether 
such means are, in general, likely to improve performance. Some think it may 
depend on whether just the right judicial toolkit and just the right forms of 
cross-branch interaction have been successfully designed into a country’s con-
stitutional culture and practice.  30  
 This is not the place to explore at length the ways in which a constitutional-
ized socioeconomic guarantee might guide and spur judicial performance in 
supportive directions that make a real difference. With judicial review in the 
picture, a New Dealer certainly can ﬁ  nd plausible instrumental reasons for 
wishing a socioeconomic commitment were present in U.S. constitutional law. 
Those reasons, however, are troubled and contested, and they may not, in the 
end, be deeply convincing to all whose convictions of morality and policy are 
strongly welfare statist.  31   As Sunstein writes,   “  it is hard to show that nations 
that are relatively more likely to help poor people do so because they have con-
stitutional provisions calling for such help.  ”  32   It seems in order, then, to ask 
what further grounds  —  of political morality, say  —  one might turn up for judg-
ing a body of constitutional law that contains socioeconomic guarantees supe-
rior to one that does not. I believe that at least one set of such reasons can be 
  29      Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 16. As Sunstein has noted, South African expe-
rience offers several possible examples.   See    C ASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITU-
TIONS DO  221 – 237 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). The most recent instance, at this writing, is  Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg , Case CCT 24/07, [2008] ZACC 1. The Constitutional Court 
held that § 26 of the Constitution, on the right to housing,   “  obliges every municipality to engage 
meaningfully with people who would become homeless ”  in cases where the municipality exercises 
its authority (for example) to evict current occupants from housing found to be a danger to them 
and others.   S. AFR. CONST.   1996, § 26(3), provides that no one may be evicted from their home 
without a court order, and the Constitutional Court held that a court must refuse an eviction order 
whenever it ﬁ  nds a lack of   “ meaningful  engagement ”   with the occupants facing homelessness. 
  Id   at ¶ 18.   
  30       See    M ARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS   (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).   
  31         Do not the very same troubles and contestations apply to the First Amendment, and every other 
cherished clause in the Bill of Rights? They do.   See generally    M ARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS   (Princeton Univ. Press 1999). Their force, however, appears to be greatly 
enhanced for socioeconomic concerns as compared with the standard liberal freedoms  — owing 
mainly, it seems, to the inevitable open-endedness in verbal formulations of constitutional welfare-
state guarantees, and the resulting alternative dangers that they, especially, seem to pose: on the 
one hand, judicial futility; on the other, judicial overreaching.   See infra ,  §  4.2.  
  32      Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 16.   10 I•CON   
identiﬁ  ed. With that established, I shall then ask how those who subscribe to 
the set of reasons I identify might respond to the current state of constitutional 
law in the United States.   
      2.2.       Liberal constitutional morality: The   “  political  ”   argument 
  Suppose you ﬁ  nd yourself convinced that each of us (who can afford to do so) 
stands under a strict moral obligation to do something toward alleviating 
material distress wherever in the country (or wherever in the world) it may be 
found. The ground of this strict moral duty, you think, lies in the sheer facts of 
suffering and common humanity. Your conviction gives you strong reason for 
receptiveness to FDR’s account of the welfare-state responsibilities of Congress. 
Here is why. 
 If any of us stands under a moral obligation to contribute toward the relief of 
others in need, it is  —  on the view I am just now attributing to you  — simply 
because others, in fact, are in need and we are able to help them. The sustaining 
cause for belief in the duty to aid is strictly and simply our knowledge that oth-
ers stand in need that we could help to cure. But that will not sufﬁ  ce to tell us 
what to do, if we also confess (and will you not?) to believing in some self-serv-
ing, equitable limit to the duty. It is, after all, an extremely contentious point, 
morally, to attribute the entire load of obligation to any or every individual. It is 
one thing to debate whether you or I stand under a moral duty to take in, over-
night, in subzero weather the homeless person who fetches up on our doorstep. 
It is a very different and hugely more contentious matter to suggest that you or 
I stand under a moral duty, ﬁ  rst, to sell everything we have and, then, to submit 
ourselves to a lifetime of eighteen-hour days, plying the most remunerative 
trades we can devise for ourselves, in order to dedicate all of the net proceeds to 
the task of getting every poor person housed, fed, and vaccinated  —  all of this 
regardless of whether others who could are helping out at all. 
  From acceptance of this point, one cannot pass immediately to negative con-
clusions about moral claims to welfare-state services or the individual’s moral 
duties in respect of such claims. The existence of the state, for one thing, blocks the 
way. As pointed out by Charles Fried and Liam Murphy, among others, there hap-
pens to exist among us an agent capable of imposing a distribution among citizens 
of the burdens of aid. This agent is capable as well — let us assume — of conducting 
a fair political deliberation on both the scope of the needs and the contours of an 
equitable distribution.  33   For those who begin with a conviction of the moral obli-
gation resting on each of us to contribute equitably toward the relief of others, just 
by virtue of our common humanity, it makes perfect sense to claim that the state 
is morally bound to exercise those capabilities. Or, if that is too metaphysical a 
view, that citizens are, in any case, morally bound to press the state to do so and 
to pay, unresistingly, the taxes required for fulﬁ  llment of the obligation. 
  33       See    C HARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG   118  –  131 (Harvard Univ. Press 1978);   LIAM MURPHY, MORAL 
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 Of course, it is true that each person, acting alone or in voluntary collabora-
tion with others, can try in good faith to deﬁ  ne and fulﬁ  ll his or her individual, 
equitable obligation to aid the needy, regardless of what others in a position to 
help may or may not do. But frustration surely awaits whoever makes the 
attempt,  34   and the argument seems very strong that our efforts along those 
lines are most effectively and satisfyingly directed toward inducing the state to 
tax us and others in order to pay for activities along the lines envisioned by 
FDR.  35  
  How far have we come? We see that to speak of prepolitical rights to assist-
ance in meeting basic needs is an order of magnitude more contentious than to 
speak of prepolitical rights, say, not to be assaulted or defrauded. Arranging 
outside the state for a fair distribution of correlative burdens seems not to be a 
troublesome issue with the latter sort of ( “ negative ” ) rights, as it is with socioe-
conomic rights.  36   But still our question remains: What is there in that set of 
perceptions that makes it even a conditional moral imperative to write a 
requirement for the state’s activity into constitutional law, over and above 
uneasy instrumentalist hopes of boosting, thereby, the chances of morally sat-
isfactory governmental performance? 
  In order to make out a further moral case for the constitutionalization of 
socioeconomic commitments, you may have to see the state as a part of the 
problem, not just the solution. You may have to see the state itself  — the  very 
fact of its existence, with our support  —  as a sustaining cause for belief in our 
obligations to do what we can to make the state something of a welfare state.  37  
You may have to embrace a moral argument for socioeconomic rights that is 
not only   “ goal  based ”   or   “ duty-based, ”   but, in Dworkin’s nomenclature, 
  “ right-based. ”  38  
  The point is this: the moral issues, in this realm, would not and could not 
exist in just the form they do, were certain basic legal-institutional contingen-
cies not as they are. The least controversial, most widely appealing moral case 
for giving legal force to socioeconomic rights  —  say, by including socioeco-
nomic guarantees in a constitutional bill of rights — is one that sidesteps claims 
about moral rights and obligations as they might arise in conditions of no law 
  34       “  We may try to live with only the resources we think we would have in a fair society, doing the 
best we can, with the surplus, to repair injustice through private charity. But since a just distribu-
tion [can only be established] through just institutions, we are unable to judge what share of our 
wealth is fair.  ”    R ONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE   265  –  267 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).   
  35     Note this is not to take a position on whether or how far the conduct of the activities thus funded 
should be centralized, bureaucratized, or kept in the hands of state functionaries.   
  36       See    M URPHY ,   supra   note  33,  at  74 – 75,  94 – 97.  
  37     I take the notion of  “ sustaining cause ”  from work of Gerald Gaus.  See   G ERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY 
LIBERALISM   19  –  25 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996).   
  38       See    D WORKIN ,   supra   note 21.   12 I•CON   
at all or a so-called state of nature. In this respect, socioeconomic rights appear 
to differ from legal rights protecting against assault, fraud, and the like. Debates 
over the morally proper scope of such garden-variety legal rights typically 
reach back to prelegal moral rights and obligations as the source of a demand 
upon lawmakers to do the correspondingly right thing in the arena of law. The 
most widely commanding moral case for installing socioeconomic rights in a 
country’s laws  —  what we may call the   “ political ”   case —  does not proceed in 
that way. It bypasses speculation about a moral duty to aid others rooted solely 
in the facts of suffering and common humanity, anchoring itself, instead, in 
the historical contingency that law exists in the country. It rests on the facts of 
social cooperation that take the form of legal ordering, and on the demands for 
general compliance with the laws that a legally ordered society directs toward 
everyone. Adding this political-moral argument to the argument based on our 
common humanity (which the political view does not challenge or displace) 
can only strengthen the background moral case for welfare-state activity. 
There is no apparent reason why adding in the political case should repel any-
one who stands already convinced without it. The political view is not, after all, 
the view that morally warranted regard for others ’  needs ﬂ  ows   “ entirely ”  from 
  “  concerns with legitimate governance.  ”  39   It is only the view that such regard 
does ﬂ  ow from such concerns. 
  All legal systems are, at bottom, practices of social cooperation, dependent 
for their survival on the persistence in society of a general compliance with the 
laws and legal interpretations that issue from those practices.  40   Thus, they all 
present  —  at least to broadly liberal sensibilities  —  the question of political justi-
ﬁ  cation or legitimacy, the need to supply a moral warrant for the demands 
for general compliance with laws produced by divided votes, directed to indi-
vidual members of a population of presumptively free and equal persons. In the 
  “ political-liberal ”  formulation of John Rawls, such demands are justiﬁ  ed when, 
and only when, the laws in question issue from a general lawmaking system —
  a constitutional regime  —  that everyone who is both rationally self-interested 
and socially reasonable may be expected to endorse.  41  
  On this view, general political legitimacy depends on what we may call a 
  “ legitimation-worthy ”   constitution. 42   To judge a constitution legitimation-
worthy is to ﬁ  nd that its prescriptions, taken as a whole so as to constitute a 
  39      Liam  Murphy,   Institutions and the Demands of Justice  , 27   PHIL. & PUB. AFF.   251, 273, 277 (1998).   
  40       See ,   e.g. ,   JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE   240 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (discussing   “ Hobbes’s 
thesis  ” ).  
  41      See   J OHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM  137, 217 (Columbia Univ. Press, paper ed. 1996) (presenting 
the   “  liberal principle of legitimacy  ” ).  
  42     I have adapted the next few paragraphs from my  The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: 
Tribe on Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory ,   TULSA L. REV.  , (2008).   See also   Frank I. Michelman, 
  Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?  , 8   REV. CONST. STUD.   101,  101 – 109,  115 – 121  (2003); 
Frank I. Michelman,   Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts ,  66   MOD. L. REV.   1  (2003).  Michelman  |  Socioeconomic rights in constitutional law   13
uniﬁ  ed political system, have a special kind of virtue or merit. Namely, they 
cast a mantle of moral justiﬁ  cation over the enforcement against everyone of 
approximately all of the laws, rulings, and decrees that issue in compliance 
with the system they constitute. The aim is thus a constitution whose terms 
are such that they allow you or me to say, with a clear conscience, that any 
law whose process of enactment and whose content pass muster under the 
constitution’s requirements can ipso facto be deemed a law with which all 
within range have good enough reason to comply, and which we, therefore, 
are justiﬁ  ed in enforcing. 
  A legitimation-worthy constitution thus does important moral work. It 
allows for a kind of proceduralization of judgments regarding the moral per-
missibility of collaboration in the enforcement of laws of possibly uncertain or 
disputed moral merits. Instead of asking whether the contested law is good or 
bad or right or wrong in substance — a question that seems bound to land us in 
obdurate division in too many cases  —  one asks whether it is   “ constitutional, ”  
a technical and a procedural question. If the answer is yes, those who enforce 
the law are deemed justiﬁ  ed in doing so, no matter (within limits) how morally 
or otherwise deﬁ  cient anyone, possibly including the enforcers, may ﬁ  nd that 
law to be. Judgments regarding the legitimacy  —  meaning the morally justiﬁ  ed 
enforceability  —  of laws are in this way proceduralized. The burden of justiﬁ  ca-
tion is displaced from the law in question to the legally constituted political 
system whence it issued. Thus, what a legitimation-worthy constitution gives 
us, if we have one, is not just a procedure but a procedure imbued with a spe-
cial virtue. It gives us, to wit, a legitimation procedure. 
  Of course, not just any constitution that you happen to ﬁ  nd in force can be 
deemed legitimation-worthy just because it is there. And what, then, shall be 
the test? For Rawlsian liberals  —  I put this very roughly  —  the test is that every-
one affected, ranking his or her own projects and commitments as no more but 
also no less deserving of consideration than anyone else’s, should be able to 
accept that constitution as an apt and fair set of governance arrangements for 
an ethically and otherwise diverse population of free and equal persons whose 
various aims, hopes, and projects will often come into conﬂ  ict. In order to meet 
that test, a lawmaking system must include a commitment — a principle — that 
affects every topic for which a  “ rational and reasonable ”  person would demand 
one as a condition of willing support for the system as a whole. It may well 
seem that we cannot fairly call on everyone, when thought of as reasonable 
but also as rational, to submit their fates to the tender mercies of a democratic-
majoritarian lawmaking system without also committing our society, from the 
start, to running itself in ways designed to constitute and sustain every person 
as a competent and respected contributor to political exchange and contesta-
tion as well as to social and economic life at large. 
 That, quite arguably, means that social rights guarantees of some kind must 
compose an essential part not just of the law but of the constitutional law  —
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whose outputs everyone is called upon to comply  —  of any country committed 
to a more or less liberal political morality. At least in a constitutional democ-
racy such as the United States — where  “ the order itself ”  is equated with consti-
tutional law and where constitutional law stands for the political contract 43  — the 
result of the Rawlsian conception would seem to be the inclusion, morally 
required, of a socioeconomic commitment in constitutional law. Any expres-
sion of the morally requisite systemic commitment will be justiﬁ  ably suspect if 
we begrudge it the social form that begets the maximum civic backing the 
country’s political culture is able to muster. So, evidently, does John Rawls 
himself conclude.  44  
  Cass Sunstein draws a contrast between a typically American,   “ pragmatic ”  
conception of a constitution’s signiﬁ  cance and a typically European,   “ aspira-
tional  ”   conception. American pragmatists, Sunstein suggests, tend to select 
principles for constitutionalization that  “ would be a sensible part of an enforce-
able constitution containing the important institution of judicial review,  ”  
whereas European aspirationalists want their constitutions to   “ afﬁ  rm, in prin-
ciple,  ”   their  nations ’    “  deepest hopes and aspirations.  ”  45   The Rawlsian view 
I have described may be said to raise a question about the extent to which 
Americans retain the full moral freedom to deny the   “ aspirational ”   aspect of 
their constitutional law.     
      3.       Sub rosa constitutional norms 
  A short digression is now required. Our premise so far has been that American 
constitutional law is, in fact, devoid of socioeconomic guarantees. Not every 
observer agrees. Lawrence Sager, for one, has developed persuasively a notion 
of   “ judicially  underenforced ”   norms in U.S. constitutional law.  46   Sager argues 
that the refusal of a court to give direct remedial effect to one or another claimed 
  43       See   Frank I. Michelman,   Living With Judicial Supremacy ,  38   WAKE FOREST L. REV.   579,  580 – 585, 
606  –  611 (2003) (documenting but not unreservedly applauding this fact of American life).   
  44       See id.   R AWLS ,   supra   note 41, at 7, 166, 228  –  229;   JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT  
47  –  48, 129 (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (treating provision for a   “ social  mini-
mum  ”   as both a lexically top-ranking principle of justice and a constitutional essential);   id .  at 
127  –  129 (grounding this moral conclusion in considerations of   “ reciprocity ”   and   “ strains  of 
commitment  ” ).  
  45     Sunstein,  American Constitution ,  supra  note 1, at 14 – 15 (distinguishing American constitutional 
pragmatism from European constitutional aspirationalism).   
  46       See ,   e.g. ,   LAWRENCE S AGER, JUSTICE  IN P LAINCLOTHES: A THEORY  OF A MERICAN C ONSTITUTIONAL P RACTICE  
86  –  102 (2004) [hereinafter   SAGER,    JUSTICE  ]; Lawrence Sager,   The Domain of Constitutional Justice ,   in  
 C ONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS , 235, 240 – 241 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1998) [hereinafter Sager,  Domain ].  See also  Frank I. Michelman,  The Protective Function of the 
State in the United States and Europe ,  in   EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM   131,  143 – 148  (Georg 
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obligation of the state does not necessarily signal the absence  —  or the court’s 
belief in the absence  —  of that obligation from American constitutional law. 
Why not? Because there may exist sound institutional reasons for judicial 
abstinence from direct enforcement, and the observance of this reticence does 
not refute a principle’s subsistence as one having the force of constitutional 
law for other actors in the legal system to whose conduct it may apply.  47  Neither 
does it deny such a principle’s binding effect on judges when invoked in some 
way other than as a ground for direct judicial enforcement. Other ways might 
include, say, invocation of the principle as a ground of justiﬁ  cation for other-
wise constitutionally questionable government action. Judicial underenforce-
ment, as Sager deploys the concept, can thus ﬁ  gure as a kind of qualiﬁ  ed judicial 
enforcement. It is decidedly not synonymous with judicial nonrecognition. 
  The kinds of institutional considerations that may inhibit direct judicial 
enforcement of certain constitutional norms are well known to constitutional 
lawyers around the world. There may be lacking a crisp, justiciable standard 
for deciding questions of compliance and violation. Enforcement may require 
forms of judicial intervention in public affairs that strain relations between the 
judiciary and the executive and legislative branches of government; or it may 
involve the judiciary in making too many subsidiary, managerial decisions 
that belong properly to the popularly accountable,   “ political ”   branches. 48  
 All of these problematic institutional ramiﬁ  cations  — inherent contestability 
of standards, strain on interbranch relations, excessive judicial engineering  —
  are likely to be salient when a claimant seeks judicial remedies for a state’s 
alleged failure to provide assistance or protection that a norm of constitutional 
law requires the state to provide. The problems recede when the state, having 
chosen to take assistive or protective action, invokes the constitutional norm 
in order to justify that action against constitutional complaint. By endorsing 
the justiﬁ  cation, the court neither ignites interbranch controversy (rather the 
reverse) nor takes on the role of social engineer. And although the exact, con-
stitutional standard of protective obligation may be debatable and remain so, a 
court upholding government action at least shares with the political branches 
responsibility for the judgment that the standard is truly engaged by the class 
of cases the government has targeted by its challenged action.  49  
  The theory of judicially underenforced constitutional norms is plausible. 
Plausible, too, may be an intimation of the presence of welfare-rights strands in 
the fabric of American constitutional law. No such inference, however, can ever 
  47       See supra  , § 1.2.   
  48       See ,   e.g.  , Sager,   Domain ,   supra   note 46, at 240.   
  49      See  Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  Individual Rights and the Powers of Government , 27  GA. L. REV.  343, 389 
(  “  For reasons [of]  . . .   comparative competence[,]  . . .   courts may rightly hesitate to translate every 
interest of constitutional magnitude into a [justiciable] constitutional right and may even defer to 
the judgments of non-judicial ofﬁ  cers concerning what the Constitution requires  ” ).  16 I•CON   
be logically or conceptually guaranteed. Take the case of  Pennell v. San Jose , 50  in 
which the Supreme Court upheld against constitutional complaint a city ordi-
nance requiring lessors of housing to absorb a special decrement in rent, when 
required to accommodate the needs of especially necessitous lessees. That hold-
ing might be taken as a sign of a judicially underenforced constitutional right to 
housing, here given precedence over a credible complaint of invasion of consti-
tutionally recognized rights of property.  51   Need the holding be so construed? 
May not constitutional law allow the state a license to infringe on certain con-
stitutional rights in response to a certain sort of reason, without necessarily say-
ing that anyone has a right to have the state exercise the license whenever that 
reason is at hand? When the Supreme Court construes U.S. constitutional law 
to permit a state to use racial classiﬁ  cations in a certain social context,  52   are we 
forced to the deduction that U.S. constitutional law obliges every state to follow 
suit in every comparable context? Must there be no play in the joints?  53  
  Some years ago, commentators noticed that the Supreme Court seemed to 
be assigning exceptional weight to certain classes of human needs in various 
contexts of constitutional litigation.  54   A chief exhibit was a series of decisions 
in which the Court found that a constitutionally guaranteed   “  right to travel  ”  
bars American states from excluding recent entrants from access to state-pro-
vided subsistence allowances  55   and emergency medical services  56   but not from 
reduced-price college education  57   or the state’s divorce courts.  58   What was the 
  “ source, ”  we wondered, for the  “ moral scale ”  by which the Court measured the 
acceptability of different exclusions?  59   Must it not be constitutional law? And 
  50         Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).   
  51       See id.  , at 15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
  52       See ,   e.g.  , Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (permitting limited consideration of race in 
selection among applicants for entrance to law school, in deference to the state’s interest in student 
body diversity).   
  53         For another instance of what we might call optional detection of a sub rosa socioeconomic 
commitment in U.S. constitutional law, see Laurence Tribe,   Unraveling   National League of Cities  : 
The New Federalism and Afﬁ  rmative Rights to Essential Services , 90  HARV. L. REV.  1065 (1977); Frank 
I. Michelman,   States  ’   Rights and States  ’   Roles: Permutations of   “ Sovereignty ”   in   National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 86   YALE L.J.   1165 (1977). Both the cited articles found signs of a constitutionalized 
socioeconomic commitment in an ostensibly federalism-based decision holding state and city 
governments immune from national-government wage and hour regulations.   
  54       See ,   e.g.  , Michelman,   Welfare Rights ,   supra   note 7, at 660  –  664;   SAGER ,   JUSTICE ,   supra   note 46, 
at 98.   
  55       See   Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).   
  56       See   Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 985 (1971).   
  57       See   Starns v, Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).   
  58       See   Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).   
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did there not emerge from these cases, then,  “ the categorical notion of a consti-
tutional right to be provided, in case of need, with   ‘  the basic necessities of 
life?  ’  ”  60  
 Well, no. At least not necessarily. Perhaps what emerges is exactly what the 
Court said: not a social-democratic (  “ redistributive ”  ) norm but a libertarian 
norm bestowing a right to change one’s state of residence without risk of exces-
sive  “ penalty ”  for doing so. No doubt, the only proper source for the moral scale 
on which excessiveness of penalty is measured in constitutional litigation is 
constitutional law; we were right about that. We had found in constitutional 
law a clear conﬁ  rmation that targeted exclusion from whatever emergency 
treatment centers the state may be maintaining is an unconscionable impedi-
ment to freedom of movement. That, however, is a very different matter, with 
a very different ideological spin and casting a very different sort of shadow over 
the conduct of civic affairs, from ﬁ  nding in constitutional law a mandate upon 
the state to operate an emergency treatment center in every locality, free of 
charge for those in ﬁ  nancial straits.   
      4.       Explaining America Away 
      4.1.       Denial 
 I cite the underenforced-norms thesis not for its possible truth but as one among 
several phenomena that might be collected under the heading   “ explaining 
America away.  ”  
  Suppose that, on Rawlsian or other grounds, you are inclined to endorse as 
true the following proposition: 
  In prosperous constitutional democracies, where a body of national 
constitutional law binds ordinary lawmaking, sound moral reasons 
ideally call for inclusion of socioeconomic commitments in that body of 
constitutional law.  61    
  And then you observe, with respect to some prominent, prosperous constitu-
tional democracy, that this country’s constitutional law is apparently devoid of 
socioeconomic commitments. Of course, the country I have in mind is the 
United States. 
  The apparent rejection of socioeconomic commitments from U.S. constitu-
tional law might make you squirm a bit. If you are American, you may not like 
to ﬁ  nd yourself in the position of branding as morally egregious the constitu-
tional law of your own country  —  not to mention the moral dispositions of the 
mass of your fellow citizens (insofar as you take U.S. constitutional law as an 
  60       Id.   (quoting from Memorial Hospital,   supra   note 53, at 259).   
  61     There may be some countries properly classiﬁ  able as constitutional democracies where national 
constitutional law of that kind (that is, the kind that binds ordinary lawmaking) does not exist, and 
to whose affairs, therefore, the proposition in question has no application.   18 I•CON   
approximately true expression of the prevalent, current values of the American 
people as a whole). For that matter, whether you are American or not, the 
appearance of a decidedly rejectionist stance in U.S. constitutional law might 
also make you anxious about your own moral certainties. The combination of 
these effects might even prompt an impulse toward denial of the fact of rejec-
tion that seems so plain to most lawyers. 
  “ In  denial ”   might, indeed, be one testy way to describe the outbreaks we see 
of suggestions that socioeconomic rights actually do have — right now, today —
 a foothold in American constitutional sensibilities (hence, the idea of Roosevelt’s 
second bill as a constitutive commitment of American society) or even have a 
foothold in U.S. constitutional law proper as, for example, a judicially underen-
forced constitutional norm.  62  If you were anxious to get the American people off 
the hook for a display of bad morals, the idea of constitutive commitments would 
come in handy. If you were anxious about getting the American polity off the 
hook for setting a bad moral example to the world, the idea of judicially under-
enforced constitutional norms would come in equally handy. Of course, this is 
not to say that either of these ideas is false or mistaken as applied to the American 
case. Either or both may be true. But neither of these ideas quite gets at what 
may be, I think, the most incisive way to explain America away  — to  explain, 
that is, how the current U.S. position need not be construed either as a norma-
tive repudiation or as an evidentiary impeachment of the   “  sound moral rea-
sons  ”  claim to which I am now assuming you are attached. The more promising 
escape route does cross paths with the thesis of judicial underenforcement.  63  
It differs, however, from the latter by spurning denial altogether and frankly 
choosing confess-and-avoid as the form of its plea.   
      4.2.       Nonideal constitutional morality 
 The key is the word  “ ideally. ”  64  Spare me your groans. This will be no Clintonian 
quibble. On that word   “ ideally ”   hangs a serious moral argument, to the effect 
that sound moral reasons do not currently call for a constitutionalization of soci-
oeconomic commitments in the U.S. Owing to the prevalence here of certain 
nonideal conditions, it may be argued, the morally superior course may be to 
pursue the Rooseveltean vision by means that do not involve constitutional law. 
  To be worth much in practice, moral argument must be capable of provid-
ing guidance for real-life choices. The choices that morality calls for   “ ideally, ”  
in some highly tractable world we might imagine, morality might reject in a 
different, less accommodating world that we actually confront. One can make 
  62       See supra  , §§ 1.1, 3.   
  63         It is also a close cousin of the   “ institutional ”   or   “ pragmatic ”   explanation for the American 
omission, proposed by Cass Sunstein.   See   Sunstein,   American Constitution  ,   supra   note 1, at 14  –  16.   
  64         Recall the proposition, given above:   “  In prosperous constitutional democracies, where a body of 
national constitutional law binds ordinary lawmaking, sound moral reasons ideally call for inclu-
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some progress by asking whether that might be the situation, here, with regard 
to the current rejection of socioeconomic commitments by  — in  particular — 
U.S. constitutional law. 
  That cannot be our situation unless there is some respect in which actual 
conditions in the U.S. deviate from those that are assumed by the ideal moral 
case for including socioeconomic commitments in constitutional law. In order 
to identify any such deviation, we need some deﬁ  nite content for the categories 
of ideal and nonideal   “ conditions. ”   (It is not, after all, that the U.S. faces some 
special difﬁ  culty in affording New Dealish programs.) Taking my cue from John 
Rawls, I shall say that conditions are  “ ideal, ”  for purposes of constructing argu-
ments regarding political morality, when the following conditions hold true: 
    (1) Sound moral reasons, once publicly brought to light, are recognized 
as such by relevant actors.   
  (2) The actors strive to make their actions comply with what the publicly 
recognized, sound moral reasons require.   
    (3) This fact of compliance will be accurately detected by concerned 
observers. (In other words, there will be no lingering, divisive disa-
greement about whether choices actually made truly comport with 
what the publicly recognized, sound moral argument permits or 
requires in the circumstances.)   65     
  Moral ideal theory seeks out principles for use where these conditions hold. 
Nonideal theory is concerned with morally best choices when one or more of them 
does not hold. The idea is that we can best learn what we want to know by seek-
ing, ﬁ  rst, to determine what morality   “ ideally ”   requires in the way of constitu-
tional choices, meaning what morality would require assuming that the correct 
choices, once brought to light by competent moral argument, will effectively gov-
ern the conduct, perceptions, and appraisals of relevant actors. We then use these 
conclusions from ideal theory to help us decide which choices would be morally 
preferred when the assumptions of ideal theory appear not to be true in the actual 
world with which we have to deal. We must allow that the morally preferred 
choice may then differ from the morally correct choice under ideal conditions.  66  
  65         These stipulations loosely follow John Rawls’s conception of   “  ideal, or   “ strict  compliance ”  
political-moral theory.   “ Strict  compliance, ”   Rawls writes,   “  means that (nearly) everyone strictly 
complies with   …   the principles of justice. We ask in effect what a perfectly just, or nearly just, 
constitutional regime might be like, and whether it may come about and be made stable   …   under 
realistic, though reasonably favorable, conditions. In this way, justice as fairness   …   probes the 
limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world (given its laws and tendencies) a 
democratic regime can attain complete realization of its appropriate political values  — democratic 
perfection, if you like. ”  Ideal theorizing is in order, Rawls suggests, when addressing disagreements 
about   “  what conception of justice is most appropriate for a democratic society under reasonably 
favorable conditions.  ”    R AWLS ,   supra   note 44, at 13.   
  66         To avoid misunderstanding: Ideal theory may be addressed to worlds in which facts of disagree-
ment or   “ pluralism ”   are assumed to be among the inevitable circumstances of justice, along with 20 I•CON   
 The Rawlsian conclusion in favor of basic-needs assurances as a constitutional 
essential is a product of ideal-theoretic argument and, as such, is not guaranteed 
to hold true for cases in which the convergence-of-opinion conditions of ideal the-
ory do not obtain. Consider, then, the case of the United States today. It may be 
debatable whether most Americans today would afﬁ  rm a moral claim on the part 
of every citizen to have the American state exert its best efforts to assure every-
one’s access  —  through work, family, or other channels  —  to adequate levels of 
subsistence, housing, health care, education, and safety. Let us, however, assume 
that most would. Recall that   “ best ”   efforts must take due account of other high-
ranking principles and goals in a country’s political morality. Observe that, in the 
U.S. today, those other principles and goals doubtless include personal liberty and 
independence, the rule of formally realizable law, and general economic prosper-
ity. Bearing these points in mind, can we also expect anything approaching a 
convergence of respectable American opinion about which courses of action open 
to government at any given time will and will not truly comport with the complex 
demands of a   “ best  efforts ”   obligation? (What fraction, for example, would insist 
on  “ tough love ”  and a free market as the right solution?) 
  That question is rhetorical, of course, and I expect almost every reader will 
nod agreement to its implication of deep and obdurate division within American 
opinion regarding government policy in the socioeconomic ﬁ  eld. Of course, 
such division by itself cannot justify, morally, an omission of socioeconomic 
assurances from U.S. constitutional law in the eyes of anyone who considers 
such an omission morally insupportable under ideal conditions. The division 
might rather point to inexcusable disarray in American public opinion. The 
undoubted existence of that division, however, opens the door to a possible 
argument to the effect that our constitutional law is morally in order, at least 
for the moment  —  given one further fact about American society. 
  That further fact is our currently entrenched reliance on judicial review as 
an indispensable guarantor of the rule of constitutional law, of the constitu-
tional contract.  67   This is not on its face a fact that falls under the heading of a 
Rawlsian nonideal condition.  68   Nevertheless, it works as a   “ but  for ”   cause of a 
other social facts such as moderate scarcity. Principles and constraints of toleration, neutrality, 
and public reason will then very likely form a part of the resulting conception of justice. What is 
  “ ideal ”   about ideal theory is that it chooses and defends such principles of justice for a pluralistic 
(disagreeing) society on the assumption that, once publicly brought to light, the chosen principles 
(of toleration and so on) will be commonly recognized, understood, accepted, and loyally followed.   
  67     Compare  DWORKIN ,  supra  note 24 , at 33 – 35 (relying, in part, on historical entrenchment of judi-
cial review in American practice for a defense of judicial review in the U.S. today):   KRAMER ,   supra  
note 22, at 7 – 8, 227 – 233. Kramer calls this fact a  “ modern understanding ”  and maintains that its 
vintage is   “ recent, ”   but he does not deny it; to the contrary, he decries it.   
  68         Rawls is open to the defensibility of judicial review as a component of a legitimation-worthy 
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morally signiﬁ  cant, standard worry (as we shall call it) about writing or read-
ing socioeconomic commitments into our constitutional law. It is true, as will 
be seen, that the predictable persistence of unquenchable controversy over 
whether government is at any moment doing what is required to honor a con-
stitutionalized socioeconomic commitment is also a but-for cause of the stand-
ard worry. My point, though, will be that without the American habit of 
dependence on judicial review as a guarantor of constitutional legality, the 
standard worry would not arise, or would be baseless if it did. 
 In a country like the United States, given both our embrace of popular govern-
ment and the irreducible uncertainty, contestability, and contingency affecting 
choices in the ﬁ  eld of socioeconomic policy, any constitutionalized socioeco-
nomic commitment inevitably must be couched in abstract, best-efforts terms, 
South African style.  69   But the American culture and practice of judicial review 
do not ﬁ  t comfortably with the seemingly boundless, practical indeterminacy of 
a commitment thus abstractly couched. By constitutionalizing socioeconomic 
rights in such a form, the standard worry runs, you would force the American 
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, into a hapless choice between usur-
pation and abdication, from which there would be no escape without either 
embarrassment or discreditation.  70   Down one path, it seems, lies the judicial 
choice to issue concrete, positive enforcement orders in a pretentious, inexpert, 
probably vain but nevertheless resented attempt to reshufﬂ  e the most basic 
resource-management priorities of the public household against the prevailing 
political will. Down the other lies the judicial choice to debase dangerously the 
entire currency of rights and the rule of law —  the spectacle of courts openly ced-
ing to executive and legislative bodies a nonreviewable privilege of indeﬁ  nite 
postponement of a declared constitutional right. In sum, a formal act of writing 
or reading socioeconomic assurances into constitutional law would run risks of 
serious damage to the integrity (and to public conﬁ  dence therein) of the coun-
try’s practices of constitutionalism, of law and legality, and of democracy, upon 
which political legitimacy depends. So goes the standard worry. 
 The worry is credible, in some degree.  71  It envisions risks with which political 
morality (not just political prudence) has good reason to be concerned  — a  point 
I do not belabor here, but which I hope is obvious. More to our purpose is that 
  69       See supra  , § 1.3.   
  70       See ,   e.g.  , Sunstein,   American Constitution ,   supra   note 1, at 15  –  16 (offering the standard worry as 
a partial, but by itself insufﬁ  cient, explanation of the American omission).   
  71         As stated in the text, the standard worry fails to take account of recent investigations of the ways in 
which reviewing courts, employing so-called weak remedies, can hope to respond usefully to complaints 
regarding performance by governments of best-efforts-style socioeconomic commitments while avoid-
ing both abdication and usurpation.   See, e.g.,    T USHNET  , supra note 30. How far these methods might be 
available to American courts, under our prevailing remedial doctrines and understandings, is an inter-
esting question that lies beyond the scope of this essay. For the sake of clarity, the analysis here simply 
assumes that the choice is between total judicial abstinence and seriously intrusive judicial remedies.   22 I•CON   
these are all risks that cannot possibly arise under the opinion-convergence 
assumptions of ideal theory. The risks all presuppose an obduracy and intensity 
of disagreement between the judiciary and at least some other civic actors about 
what morality and the Constitution require of government and whether govern-
ment is currently conducting itself in conformity to those requirements. No such 
disagreement can arise where everyone is assumed always to recognize compel-
ling moral reasons, once those have publicly been brought to light, and to gauge 
accurately the best-efforts compliance of others with what those reasons require 
in a given situation. Bearing this point in mind, we can see how the existence of 
nonideal conditions in the U.S. might enable an argument that the morally pref-
erable course there, all things considered, is to exclude socioeconomic commit-
ments from constitutional law, although ideally they must be included. 
  Something more will be needed, though. The argument for the situated 
moral wisdom of leaving our constitutional law as it stands depends on a per-
ception of the moral risks engendered by drawing the judiciary into confronta-
tions with the government over the government’s performance of claimed 
socioeconomic commitments. The risks in question are ones that can arise 
only where judicial constitutional review really does serve as a linchpin of con-
stitutional legality, as it does currently in the United States. Completion of the 
argument for the defensibility of the American omission under nonideal 
public-epistemic conditions thus depends on American political culture’s cur-
rent penchant for judicial review. 
 The standard worry, with its attendant suggestion of moral risk, depends on 
the view that a norm cannot be constitutional law, cannot count as constitu-
tional law, without being turned over, lock, stock, and barrel, to judges for 
enforcement. It was in anticipation of this turn in the analysis that I insisted, in 
section 1.2, on a conception of a right’s existence in law that did not necessar-
ily posit, à la Holmes, a judicial remedy for violation. For suppose we thought 
that Americans, by and large, accepted the more minimal view I offered there 
of what it means for a right to exist in law — roughly, that those who inexcusa-
bly act in violation of the right thereby expose themselves to the special sort of 
public blame or censure that we would typically direct toward lawbreakers. 
The moral-risk objection to writing socioeconomic commitments into U.S. 
constitutional law would then collapse. In that case, we should feel perfectly 
free to write socioeconomic commitments into our constitutional law, while at 
the same time directing courts to get lost when controversies raged over the 
sufﬁ  ciency of the government’s performance of such commitments. 
  One might draw the following conclusion: Americans who believe that 
sound moral reasons ideally require the inclusion of socioeconomic commit-
ments in constitutional law should see it as their moral obligation to do their 
best to persuade Americans at large of the gap between a norm’s being law and 
its being available for judicial enforcement and, given the existence of this gap, 
of the perfect prudence of writing certain norms into constitutional law while 
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But even that proposition is not free of doubt. Burke must have his say. In any 
political culture, at any given time, there may be structures of belief on which 
conﬁ  dence in the rule of law, legitimacy  —  call it what you will  — depends  and 
which cannot be torn down with any degree of conﬁ  dence about the conse-
quences. The less certain you are about all that, the more receptive you may be 
to a claim that there are sound moral reasons  —  in these United States  — to  set-
tle for a New Deal constitutive commitment, if we have it or can obtain it, and 
to leave constitutional law alone. 
  With that question hanging (I do not propose to answer it), we can see how 
a respectable, moral case for the exclusion of socioeconomic assurances from 
U.S. constitutional law might possibly trump an ideal-theoretic case for their 
inclusion. We can also see how the situation may be, to some degree, special to 
the United States. If we thought it would be a safe and simple matter here — as it 
very well might be in many or most other countries  —  to write a socioeconomic 
commitment into constitutional law but instruct the judiciary to leave compli-
ance judgments to purely political forums, the undoubted existence of nonideal 
conditions would do nothing to impeach the ideal-theoretic case for inclusion 
(although, of course, it might fatally complicate the politics of getting it done). 
  For suppose we did have a clear and widely shared understanding, here, 
that a norm can be placed off limits to judicial enforcement without impeach-
ing its status as law that counts as such. The Rawlsian case we reviewed in 
section 2.2 would then certainly call for inclusion in American constitutional 
law of an abstractly framed, best-efforts commitment to the satisfaction of eve-
ryone’s basic needs. So what if the commitment would have to be so abstractly 
couched as to become a ﬁ  eld for endless political debate? That matters of the 
deepest political-moral import should be found endlessly debatable in a democ-
racy cannot itself be counted a danger to legitimacy, without dooming the 
chances for legitimacy in any modern, plural society.  72  
  The analysis I have just completed adds up to this: Assuming that inclusion 
of socioeconomic rights in constitutional law is morally required under ideal 
conditions of opinion-convergence, with or without judicial review also being 
a part of the constitution, moral reasoning under non-ideal conditions argua-
bly may favor exclusion, but only if judicial review occupies a certain, special 
place in the society’s legal culture. Where the latter condition is absent, an 
ideal-theoretic moral conclusion in favor of a constitutionalized socioeconomic 
commitment would hold even under nonideal conditions. 
  Thus it can be argued. Suppose you accepted the argument. Would it leave 
you with a new moral ground for objection to judicial review?  73   Morally  based 
objections to judicial review usually complain of the removal of decision-making 
  72         For elaboration of this point, see Frank I. Michelman,   The constitution, social rights, and liberal 
political justiﬁ  cation  , 1   INT’L J. CONST. L.(  I  • CON)  13,  25 – 30,  33 – 34  (2003).  
  73         Not new in the sense of never before suggested.   See ,   e.g.  , Robin West,   Katrina, The Constitution, 
and the Legal Question Doctrine  , 81   CHI.-KENT L. REV.   1127 (2006).   24 I•CON   
authority from those who morally ought to have it.  74   The argument presented 
here suggests the possibility of a different sort of moral complaint. The com-
plaint would be that overdependence on judicial review can ground a situa-
tionally valid, moral objection to putting into your constitutional law something 
that moral ideal theory tells you should be there. The overdependence thus 
provides moral cover for a choice that moral ideal theory condemns. Is that a 
moral cost to be chalked up against the argument for judicial review? It would 
not necessarily be decisive, any more than judicial review, at this stage of our 
history, is purely a matter of choice.               
  74       See ,   e.g.  , Jeremy Waldron,   The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review ,  115   YALE L.J.   1346 
(2007).  